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Abstract 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a corporate entity is its Chief Accounting Officer. He is at the head of 
management which according to Miller (2005) is more of hands on activity; conducting and supervising actions 
with the judicious use of means to accomplish certain goal/s. The Chairman of the Board of Directors on the 
other hand is the chief policy or law maker of the enterprise. CEO Duality occurs when the CEO is equally the 
Chairman of the company or Board of Directors. Since the position of a CEO is a critical element of corporate 
governance of a company, a combination of the roles of CEO and chairman of the company could have far 
reaching implications on stewardship accounting and corporate governance and by extension corporate 
performance. Poor corporate governance has been implicated in most corporate failures in and outside Nigeria. 
Hence this paper appraises the practice of CEO Duality in Nigeria and examines its implications on effective 
corporate governance and performance of Non-Financial companies in the Nigerian Stock Market. It uses panel 
data on the performances (ROE) of companies with CEO-Duality and those without CEO-Duality to determine 
the effect of this duality on company performance. A sample size of 30 companies selected through the Taro 
Yameni formula was used while their performances (ROE) for the years 2006 to 2010 were equally used without 
further sampling. A test of significant difference was performed using the E-view statistics. It was discovered 
that there is a significant difference between the performances of companies with CEO duality and those without 
CEO duality. Again the average performance of the former was statistically and significantly lower than the 
average performance of the later. It was therefore recommended that as a veritable means of strengthening 
corporate governance and enhancing performance, CEO duality should be minimized/reduced as much as 
possible. Chairmen of companies should not double as Chief Executive Officers.    
Key words: Chief Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board, Stewardship Accounting, Corporate performance. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The distinct characteristic of ‘divorced management from ownership’ of modern corporations, make stewardship 
accounting inevitable. It is therefore a basic element in company administration and management. Professional 
managers who (Wikipedia, 2007) are considered more competent than the owners of the corporations and are 
thus hired to run and manage the affairs of the companies are expected to guarantee transparency accountability 
and fairness in their duties (Howard, 2000). This is a basic tenet of corporate governance. It is guaranteed by 
ensuring that various mechanisms are put in place to ensure seamlessness in accommodating corporate goal 
(ownership goal) and management goal in an enterprise. Tricker (1984) had distinguished management and 
control in the bid to explain corporate governance by asserting that if management is about running business, 
then governance in the corporate world is about seeing that companies are run properly. Hence corporate 
governance is concerned with ways in which all parties interested in the well-being of the firm, in order words 
the stakeholders, attempt to ensure that managers and other insiders take measures or adopt mechanisms that 
safeguard the interests of the stakeholders. Separation of duties usually depicted in an ‘organigram’, is not only a 
feature of good internal control but also an essential ingredient of good corporate governance.     
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the firm including spelling out the rules and procedures for making decisions. Hence Wolfenson 
(1999), Uche (2004) and Akinsulire (2006) all agree that corporate governance provides the structure through 
which the company’s objectives are set and the strategies, the tactics and the means, of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance defined. Manne (1965) however, set the tone which was later made louder by 
Alchian and Demetz (1972) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989) to the effect that the Board of Directors (BOD) is the 
most important and possibly the greatest beneficiary of all good mechanisms of internal control including 
corporate governance. This is partly because the bulk stops on its table. But most importantly, the BOD is the 
primary means through which the shareholders exercise control over their investment. In the corporate 
governance chain, the BOD is answerable to the shareholders and all external markets for corporate governance- 
regulators, government authorities, labour unions et cetera. The Board of Directors is the Top Management 
unarguably headed by a Chairman who may double as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the company. Within 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.12, 2013 
 
12 
the jurisdictions of the Board, the Chairman, the CEO, other management staff including supervisors, the 
management vocabularies/functions such as administration, execution, planning, managing, directing, 
supervising and even controlling, are manifest.  If everything goes well and no corporate governance issues are 
implicated in corporate failures, no ‘eye brow’ would be raised as to the strictness in apportioning these 
functions. But alas, companies have gone under at alarming rate in Nigeria in recent times and while external 
factors (economic infrastructure especially power, legal architecture, fiscal policies et cetera) may not have been 
exonerated, much blame is on absence of strong commitment to the tenets of corporate governance. Cadbury Plc, 
Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), Kaduna Textile Industry, 
Asaba Textile Industry, Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) Benue Cement Company Gboko, Niger 
Cement Company Nkalagu, Nigerian Coal Corporation (NCC), Leventis Plc, et cetera and several banks are 
some of the corporate failures in recent time in Nigeria for which strong questions have been raised on the failure 
of corporate governance.    
Little wonder then that the Federal government of Nigeria in the bid to strengthen corporate governance and 
protect the investors from the unscrupulous management and directors of listed firms in Nigeria came up with a 
‘’Code of Corporate Governance Best Practices’ in 2003. Essentially the code prescribes that the business of a 
firm should be managed under the direction of a BOD who delegates to the CEO and other management staff, 
the day to day management of the affairs of the firm. In addition, the Board is expected to appoint a qualified 
person as the CEO as well as other management staff. In codifying best practices for good corporate governance 
in Nigeria through the 2003 Code, the CBN 2006 Code, and the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission 
revised Code of Corporate Governance 2009, the government is essentially trying to work in tandem with global 
best practices as codified by such world organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for 
Economic Corporation and Development (OECD). 
In spite of all these codes, while many companies have converted to Non-Dual CEO leadership on the heels of 
the report of several high-profile cases of powerful dual CEOs who were found to have abused their tremendous 
power at the expenses of the company and shareholders, others still maintain the Dual CEO leadership. The 
pertinent question that arises therefore becomes, to what extent does CEO duality impede corporate performance 
in Nigeria through weakening of corporate governance?  This paper thus sets out to appraise CEO-Duality, 
Corporate Governance and Performance and thereby ascertain the significance of CEO Duality on corporate 
performance of Non-Financial Companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange by hypothesizing that there is a 
significant negative impact of CEO Duality on corporate performance through weakening of corporate 
governance. Part one of the paper introduces the work, part two contains the literature review, part three the 
methodology, while part four presents and discusses the findings and part five concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is synonymous with the responsibility associated with large scale artificial persons that 
lack the capacity to manage themselves (Salomon v Salomon and CO ltd, 1897). By vesting the day to day 
running of the entity to a team of directors and senior managers who are distinct from their owners, ownership 
becomes divorced from management necessitating the guarantee for transparency, accountability and fairness in 
the management of the enterprise. Mayer, (2000) opines that corporate governance is about control and running 
of companies where concerns are raised as to who is in control, for how long and over what activities? Deakin 
and Hughes (1997) posit that corporate governance entails the connection between the internal control 
machinery of corporations and the general public’s notion of the scope of corporate accountability. Hence, it is a 
set of rules applicable to the direction and control of companies where however, management is seen to connote 
running a business and governance becomes ensuring that it is run properly (Tricker, 1984). Specifically, 
corporate governance creates a framework of goals and policies to guide an organization’s progress and forms a 
foundation for assessing Board and management performance (Adedotun, 2003). In a more elaborate tone, 
Oyediran (2003) stresses that corporate governance looks at the institutional and policy framework for 
management of corporation from the very beginnings, in entrepreneurship, through the government structures, 
company law, privatization, insolvency and to market exit. It not only depends on the legal, regulatory, 
institutional, environmental and societal interests of the communities in which it operates, but also has impact on 
the reputation and long-term success of a company. This long-term success can hardly be engendered by CEO-
Duality given that the BOD could be plagued by the domineering influence of the Chairman who doubles as 
CEO in the affairs of the company especially in cases where the majority shareholder occupies these positions. 
The practice not only weakens he oversight ability but may also impair the independence judgment of the BOD 
on company strategies and decisions 
2.2 Corporate Performance 
The capacity and ability of a firm to use its assets to generate revenue from its primary mode of business depict 
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its overall financial health. When this is measured periodically, it forms the basis for both horizontal and vertical 
analysis and comparison. According to Demsetz and Lehn (2004), financial performance involves measuring a 
firm’s policies and operations in monetary terms which are depicted in the firm’s return on investment, return on 
assets, value added, et cetera. That is, accounting profit ratios proxy corporate performance. Corporate 
governance has been found to correlate positively with corporate performance, (Attiye and Robina, 2007) both 
seen from these accounting ratios of the firm and the movement of its price in the stock market. While the 
accounting profit ratios are measured by the Accountant constrained only by the standards set by his profession, 
the performance as reflected by the movement of its price in the stock market is measured by the investors 
constrained by their acumen, information, optimism or pessimism and general psychology. In either case 
however, Young (2000) suggests that best governance practices exert a positive influence on firm performance 
since it prevents management and controlling investors from taking initiatives to expropriate minority investors. 
This, it is argued impacts positively on the firm’s goodwill and ability to attract equity capital from prospective 
marginal investors. Hence in considering approaches to measurement of firm level financial performance, Sanda 
et al (2003), insist that this is found in social science research based on market prices, accounting ratios and total 
factor profitability where market prices are readily obtained from national stock exchanges for all listed firms. 
While profit is a flow concept, profit margin measures the flow of profits over some period compared with 
revenue and costs and thus there could be gross profit margin, operating profit margin, return on equity et cetera. 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm’s financial performance stems from the understanding 
that economic value is driven by governance mechanisms such as the legal protection of capital, the firm’s 
competitive environment, its ownership structure, board composition and size, CEO-Duality (the focus of this 
paper), existence of Audit Committee and financial policy (Uadiele, 2010). In this light, Gompers et al (2003) 
find that stock returns are higher for firms with strong shareholder rights as compared to firms with weak 
shareholder rights. This suggests that firms with stronger or better corporate governance provisions outperform 
those with poor governance provisions in terms of profits, capital acquisition and sales growth. They also add 
that there is substantial evidence showing that weakly governed firms experience lower performance based on 
operating performance measures, lower sales growth and net profit margins. This has been corroborated by 
Khatab et al (2011) from a study of twenty listed firms in the Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan. 
2.3 Assessment of Current Corporate Governance Issues and Corporate Performance In Nigeria. 
The illicit activities and insider dealings of most Nigerian Bank Chief Executives as revealed by the Governor of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009 summarizes the level of decadence in corporate governance in Nigerian 
companies. Even at that, corporate governance is yet at a rudimentary stage in Nigeria with less than 40% of 
quoted companies including banks having recognized the codes of corporate governance, (CBN, 2006). But 
Nganga et el (2003) insist that corporate governance is a crucial ingredient in the process of encouraging 
domestic investment as well as inflow of foreign direct investment in Nigeria. They further lament that corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria reflect systemic governance problems including the inability to ensure effective 
capacity constraints by administrators and ineffective implementation of laws. This leads to limited economic 
growth (Suberu and Aremu, 2010). And in realization of the need to align with international best practices, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in collaboration with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), 
inaugurated a seventeen (17) member committee in June 2000 in Nigeria headed by Atedo Peterside, to review 
and identify weaknesses in the current corporate governance practices in Nigeria and make recommendations for 
improvement. According to Inyang (2009), the members of the committee were selected to cut across relevant 
sectors of the economy including members of professional organization, the private sector and regulatory 
agencies. The committee submitted a draft code, which was widely publicized throughout the country and 
reviewed in major financial centers of Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt to elicit stakeholders’ input prior to 
finalization. The final report was approved in 2003 by the boards of SEC and CAC. The release of the 2003 code 
marked a watershed in the development of good corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Essentially, the Code 
stipulated among other things, the separation of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board. 
The subsequent Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and other Financial Institutions in Nigeria released by 
the Bankers’ Committee never again bothered to address the CEO-Duality debacle instead it concentrated on the 
membership of the BOD in addition to recommending a formal assessment of the effectiveness of first the BOD 
and separate contributions of each director including the Chairman.    
2.4 CEO-Duality 
The works of Heath and Norman (2004), Mintz (2004), Sanda et al (2005), Hua and Zin (2007), Khanna and Ken 
(2008) and Abdullah and Valentine (2009) seem to provide a theoretical basis for corporate governance on the 
theories of agency, stakeholders, stewardship, resource-dependency, transaction cost and even complexity. 
Agency relationship creates a contract of a principal engaging an agent to perform some service on his behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. In the corporate world, this brings about 
separation of ownership (shareholders) from control (board) with the introduction of external investors. Agency 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.12, 2013 
 
14 
theory thus argues that in order to protect the interests of shareholders, the board of directors must assume an 
effective oversight function. This includes evaluating CEO performance based on mutually agreed objectives 
and company performance criteria. It also connotes the BOD having to not only approve the overall approach 
towards development and succession but also ultimately rewarding all stakeholders including the CEO 
accordingly (Burton, 2000). To effectively do this, and ensure good corporate governance, management which 
includes the CEO must be independent of the BOD.  
As for the stewardship theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) posit that managers act as stewards to the business 
and should be expected to have no self-interest other than the firm interest which would be the optimization of 
firm core objectives. This apparent lack of any other interest reduces the need for checking the excesses of 
neither the Board nor the CEO. Hence based on the stewardship theory, there could be Duality. The Chairman is 
the CEO. This is supported by the work of Coleman (2007) who argues that there should be no different roles for 
the Chairman and the CEO and Elsayed (2007) who equally argues that duality does not have a substantial 
impact on the performance of a company.  
But this school of thought stands opposed by those who strongly argue in support of agency theory and maintain 
that a single officer holding both positions is bound to create a conflict of interest that could adversely affect the 
interests of the shareholders. To the later school of thought, the core argument is that CEO duality creates a 
CEO/Chairman who both directs BOD meetings (thus formulates policies and rules) and executes the same 
policies which may have him unrestrained from acting in his own self-interest in the absence of separation of 
powers. This automatically undermines the oversight power and functions of the BOD and endangers checks and 
balances which are essential ingredients of internal control and good corporate governance. In this regard, 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) and Timme (1993) maintain that a BOD controlled by the CEO is likely to lack 
independence, resulting to intensified agency friction and leading ultimately, to poor firm performance. To 
buttress this point, Donaldson and Davis (1991), argue that CEO duality establishes strong unambiguous 
leadership embodied in a unity of command and that firms with CEO duality may make better and faster 
decisions and consequently, may outperform those that split the two positions. Therefore, CEO Duality is anti 
corporate governance and non beneficial to the overall performance of the firm. This is the position of the 
agency theory. 
But the stewardship theory, as pointed out earlier, supports CEO Duality as a core condition to establish a 
necessary and strong command chain at the top management of the firm. It maintains that whenever one person 
holds both positions, he is better able to act with precision, become more efficient and effective. Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (2003) posit that CEO Duality improves the speed and effectiveness of decision making, reduces 
conflicts at the BOD level which may have positive impact on firm performance. According to Hundley (2011), 
the combination of the positions of Chairman and CEO provides a single focal point for company leadership 
while a powerful and effective CEO/Chairman creates an image of stability and instills a sense of well-being to 
its employees as well as its shareholders. 
But even market practitioners and shareholder right activists have posited that the separation of CEO and 
Chairman can be a critical mechanism to eliminating managerial and shareholder conflicts of interest as well as 
to improving the governance of the BOD, Baysinger and Butler, (1985); Monks and Minow 2001 and OECD 
2004). It could therefore be seen that the argument goes on and on in circles. There is no unanimous agreement 
yet as to the superiority of any of the two schools of thought. Empirical evidence based not only on the nature of 
industry but also on local peculiarities is needed to lay the argument to rest.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In studying the perception of company administrators, managers and Accountants on the impact of CEO-Duality 
on corporate performance, the survey approach involving population, sample and sampling was adopted. The 
population of the study is made up of all the non-financial companies quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange 
within the period covered by the study. Using the Taro Yameni formula at 95 percent confidence level and error 
margin of 0.05, a sample size of 72 is selected. Through cluster random sampling, sample elements representing 
all the sections of the non-financial companies were picked from the sample frame. Three copies of the 
questionnaire were administered to each company selected. The Microsoft Special Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) was used to test the hypothesis that there is a no significant negative impact of CEO Duality on corporate 
performance. To enhance the robustness of the findings, an oral interview was conducted on the sampled firms. 
The questionnaire established the effect of CEO-Duality on the following: increased board monitoring, 
effectiveness of control, reduced financial scandal, investors’ confidence, effective communication, information 
diffusion, fastness of decision making, and financial performance/profitability. Responses were reduced into a 5-
point Linkert scale and analyzed.  
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4. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSION 
4.1 Examination of impact of CEO Duality on Corporate Governance and Performance 
From table 4.1 shown in Appendix 1, it is seen that the general perception of company administrators and 
managers is that CEO Duality is inimical to company performance. The mean value of 4.36 which is very close 
to the Agree value of 4 suggests strongly that Non CEO Duality enhances corporate performance. Specifically, 
apart from the second parameter that links CEO Duality with overall corporate governance which recorded a 
mean value of 4.53 showing very strong agreement from the respondents, all others recorded mean values closer 
to the Agree value of 4. For instance CEO Duality negatively affects firm performance 4.48; Non CEO Duality 
promotes increased BOD monitoring and efficient control 4.41; Non CEO Duality reduces corporate financial 
scandals and boosts investors’ confidence 4.32; Non CEO Duality enhances information diffusion and quality 
decision making, 4.24; and Non CEO Duality reduces arbitrariness and budget indiscipline, 4.19. All these point 
to the fact that company administrators and managers are nearly unanimous that separation of the positions of 
Chairman of the BOD and the CEO is necessary to enhance corporate governance and performance. 
 
4.2 Test of hypothesis 
Null hypothesis: CEO- Duality does not have any negative impact on the performance of non financial 
companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
 
REGRESSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
performance of quoted companies 3.2515 1.68271 648 
CEO- Duality 1.2083 .50174 648 
 
Correlations 
    performance of quoted companies CEO- Duality 
Pearson Correlation performance of quoted companies 1.000 -.220 
CEO- Duality -.220 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) performance of quoted companies . .000 
CEO- Duality .000 . 
N performance of quoted companies 648 648 
CEO- Duality 648 648 
 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .220(a) .048 .047 1.64291 .021 
a  Predictors: (Constant), CEO- Duality 
b  Dependent Variable: performance of quoted companies 
 
ANOVA(b) 
Model   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 88.350 1 88.350 32.733 .000(a) 
Residual 1743.648 646 2.699     
Total 1831.998 647       
a  Predictors: (Constant), CEO- Duality 
b  Dependent Variable: performance of quoted companies 
 
Coefficients (a) 
Model   
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) 4.141 .168   24.592 .000 
CEO- Duality -.737 .129 -.220 -5.721 .000 
a Dependent Variable: performance of quoted companies 
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TABLE 4.2 SPSS RESULT ON THE EFFECT OF CEOD  ON PQC 
Particulars R
 
R
2 
Adj. R
2 
DW Standard Coefficients F Sig 
Beta T- Value 
All Firms 0.220
(a) 
0.048 0.047 .021 0 -.220 -5.721 32.733 0.000 
 
NOTE: 
R = Correlation Coefficient or Beta 
R
2
 = Coefficient of Determination 
Adj. R
2
 = Adjusted Coefficient of Determination 
DW = Durbin Watson (d) test statistic 
T-value =  Student t- test Statistic 
F = F- test statistic 
 
Interpretation on corporate performance : 
The regression sum of squares (88.350) is less than the residual sum of squares (1743.648), which indicates that 
more of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model.  The significance value of the F 
statistics (0.000) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is not due to chance. 
R, the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0.220, indicates that there is negative   relationship between 
the CEO-Duality   and performance of quoted companies.  R square, the coefficient of determination, shows that 
04.8% of the variation in the performance of quoted companies is explained by the model. 
With the linear regression model, the error of estimate is high, with a value of about 1.64291 The Durbin Watson 
statistics of .021, which is not up to 2 indicates that there is no autocorrelation. 
The CEO-Duality    and performance of quoted companies of 0.22 indicates a negative significance between 
CEO-Duality and performance of quoted companies , which is statistically negative  significant (with t = -5.721).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis should be accepted and the alternative hypothesis accordingly rejected.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The positive relationship between Non CEO duality and corporate performance as found in this paper using 
secondary data sourced from the Annual Reports of the 72 sampled financial companies primary data from their 
administrators and managers, is in tandem with the finding of Kajola (2008) and suggests that when separate 
persons occupy the positions of Chairman of the Board and the CEO of a company, the overall corporate 
governance tone of the company improves, the investors’ confidence improves and the various financial 
performance indicators of the company become positively affected. This too, agrees with the works of Yermack 
(1996), Brown et al (2004) and Bokpin (2006). Not surprisingly too, the correlation and chi-square tests results 
align themselves to the findings of Uma and Allen (1997), Amarjit and Neil (2011) and Cheng (2011) from 
studies carried out in other environments and using different populations. Essentially, CEO duality is positively 
associated with the market value of the firm which is also influenced by positive movement in its profit margin 
and return on equity. Non CEO Duality tends to engender greater transparency through appropriate corporate 
disclosure and attendant enhanced monitoring and efficient control.  Independence of the BOD is a sin qua non 
for proper checks and balances and improved corporate governance. It is therefore strongly recommended here 
that the positions of the chairman and the CEO should be occupied by different persons only limited may be by 
the size or ownership structure of the company. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 4.3 Perceived Impact of CEO Duality on Corporate Governance and Performance 
 No of 
respondents 
Strongly 
Agree 
(SA) 5 
Agree 
(A) 4 
No Idea 
(;lNI) 3 
Disagree 
(D) 2 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(SDA) 1 
TOTAL MEAN 
CEO Duality 
negatively 
affects firm 
performance 
216 160 (800) 30 (120) 4(12)  14 (28) 8 (8) 968 4.48 
Non CEO 
Duality 
enhances 
overall 
corporate 
governance 
216 155(775) 40(160) 5(15) 12(24) 4(4) 978 4.53 
Non CEO 
Duality 
promotes 
increased 
BOD 
monitoring  
216 162(810) 20(80) 4(12) 20(40) 10(10) 952 4.41 
Non CEO 
Duality leads  
to efficient 
control by the 
BOD 
216 68(340) 86(344) 10(30) 43(86) 9(9) 809 3.75 
Non CEO 
Duality 
reduces 
corporate 
financial 
scandals 
216 150(750) 30(120) 4(12) 20(40) 12(12) 934 4.32 
 Non CEO 
Duality boosts 
investors’ 
confidence 
216 110(550) 65(260) 5(15) 28(56) 8(8) 889 4.12 
Non CEO 
Duality 
enhances 
information 
diffusion 
and quality 
decision 
making 
216 128(640) 50(200) 10(30) 20(40) 8(8) 918 4.25 
Non CEO 
Duality 
reduces 
arbitrariness 
216 125(625) 50(200) 8(24) 22(44) 11(11) 904 4.19 
Non CEO 
Duality 
enhances 
budget 
indiscipline  
216 60(300) 95(380) 8(24) 49(98) 12(12) 814 3.77 
Average        4.20 
Source; Field survey 2013. 
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